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lyzes the determinants of individual support for a large government motivated by
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ndings are revealing
on the political feasibility of tax reforms, as well as of alternative measures to
achieve scal consolidation - a relevant policy issue after the strains put by the
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Economic theory analyzes preferences for redistribution using the canonical framework
for utility maximization for consumption and leisure. Then, some mechanisms of ag-
gregation of individual preferences determine the equilibrium level of taxes and social
benets, as in the basic workhorse political economic model provided by Meltzer and
Richard (1981), who in turn build upon Romer (1975). In their framework, lump sum
transfers are nanced by a proportional tax on income. A prediction of the model is
that the size of general redistributive programmes reects the preferences of the me-
dian voters, and is determined by their relative position on the scale of productivity, a
measure of the income generating ability. Since these seminal contributions, a number
of factors other than current income have been proposed to explain di¤erent individ-
ual attitudes toward governmental redistribution. As an immediate extension of the
self-interest motivation, Benabou and Ok (2001) put forward the prospect of upward
mobility hypothesis. In their model, opposition to redistributive policies might come
from people with income below the mean who rationally expect to move above the
mean in the future. Departing from motivations directly linked to individual pecuniary
gains, a few papers have highlighted the role of social values and beliefs. For instance,
Piketty (1995) emphasizes the importance of past personal income mobility experience
in shaping current views on the incentive costs of redistribution. Also, Benabou and
Tirole (2005) suggest that parents might transmit certain views regarding the reality
of inequality and social mobility to their children in order to inuence their incentives.
Di¤erent historical experiences may lead to various social norms about what is accept-
able or not in terms of inequality in di¤erent countries (Alesina and Fuchs Schundeln,
2007). Moreover, perception of fairness matters. Alesina and Angeletos (2005) propose
a model in which di¤erent beliefs about how fair social competition is and what de-
termines income inequality inuence the redistributive policy chosen democratically in
a society. The interaction between self-fullled social beliefs and welfare policies may
lead to multiple equilibria. In particular, high taxes and a high level of redistribution
will prevail in equilibrium as a means to correct for income inequality derived from
exogenous drivers, such as luck. Where, on the other hand, market outcomes are con-
sidered as mainly determined by individual e¤ort, taxes and redistribution are lower.
Interestingly, alongside di¤erent cultural views on the merits of equality versus indi-
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vidualism, this framework contributes to explaining the observed systematic di¤erences
between the US and Europe, particularly western European countries, when it comes to
redistributive policies, documented for instance in Alesina and Glaeser (2004). Finally,
the desire to act in accordance with public values, or to obtain high social standing
could play a critical role in the determination of preferences for redistributive policies,
as highlighted by Corneo and Grüner (2000, 2002). Importantly, all these factors can
be directly or indirectly incorporated into the standard utility maximization framework
(Alesina and Giuliano, 2009).
As individual preferences will eventually translate into redistributive policies via
some mechanism of aggregation, a critical issue is to identify the factors behind support
for redistribution. A large body of empirical literature has investigated such determi-
nants making use of survey data. In these contributions, preferences for redistribution
(the dependent variable in the estimating equations) are generally captured through in-
dividual self-reported views on the whether or not the government should have an active
role in reducing income inequality. Using recent data from the European Social Survey,
we analyze the determinants of individual attitudes regarding governmental redistrib-
utive policies in 30 European countries. In particular, the data allows us to distinguish
between two important dimensions of redistribution: the size of government (dened in
terms of more generous social benets nanced by higher taxes) and the design of the
personal income tax. In the rst instance, our dependent variable, capturing the im-
plications of redistribution for the public budget, can immediately measure individual
support for a large government. We nd not only that preferences for redistribution as
traditionally measured in the literature are a signicant determinant of such support,
but also that other factors linked to the beliefs on e¤ects of redistributive policies, the
perceived functioning of the welfare state institutions, as well as trust explain di¤erent
individual attitudes toward redistributive public policies. In addition, as the design of
the tax system is a major element in redistributive policies of developed economies,
we also investigate the determinants of stated preference for progressive tax schedules.
Again, we nd that preferences for redistribution, as well as the associated attitudes
towards inequality and fairness, matter in explaining such preferences. While not in-
uencing the support for a large government, self-interest makes people more averse
to progressive taxation. The analysis can shed further light on what determines the
observed size of governments and the design of personal income tax systems through
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the demand side channel. Overall, our ndings might give useful indications on the
political feasibility of tax reforms, as well as of alternative measures to achieve scal
consolidation. This is particularly relevant at the policy level, given the need to reduce
public nance imbalances induced by the recent nancial and economic crisis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briey describes the data
used in the paper. In section 3 we introduce our main variables of interest. Individual
level evidence on the determinants of the support for a large government is presented
in section 4. Section 5 investigates the determinants of preferences over the income tax
schedule. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
The data we use are from the fourth wave of the European Social Survey (ESS), con-
ducted in 2008-2009. The European Social Survey (the ESS) is a biennial multi-country
survey administered in a large sample of European nations. The survey has been con-
ducted four times, with the rst round elded in 2002-2003, and the fourth in 2008-2009.
The questionnaire consists of a coremodule containing questions on socio-economic,
political, psychological and demographic variables which remains relatively constant
from round to round and two rotating modules, to be repeated at intervals, devoted
each to a substantive topic or theme addressing particular academic or policy concerns.
We use the fourth round because it is the only round containing detailed questions on
attitudes towards welfare state and its nancing, contained in the rotating module on
welfare attitudes in a changing Europe. Table 1 reports the country coverage and the
sample averages of the main variables of interest.
3 Preferences for redistribution and the demand for
a large government
In the literature individual preferences for redistribution have been captured using sur-
vey questions on the role of government in improving the standard of living of the poor
people (e.g. in the General Social Survey for the US), or to ensure that everyone is pro-
vided for (e.g. in the World Value Survey). Alternatively, using the International Social
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Survey programme, Corneo and Grüner (2002) employ a variable that asks whether the
government should reduce di¤erences in income between people with high income and
those with low income. Question B30 in the ESS adopts a very similar formulation,
and reads as follows:Please say to what extent you agree or disagree with (each of the)
following statement(s): The government should take measures to reduce di¤erences in
income levels. Respondents can choose among agree strongly, agree, neither
agree nor disagree, disagree, or disagree strongly, ordered on 1 to 5 classication.
This provides an adequate measure for the preferences for political redistribution as tra-
ditionally intended in the literature. Figure 1 reports the density functions by country.
With few exceptions, the distribution has a fat tail to the left, indicating a prevailing
support for redistribution. Table 1 shows that in the whole sample the mean level is
around 2.
In the ESS round 4 individual demand for di¤erent sizes of the government can be
elicited from the following question: Many social benets and services are paid for
by taxes. If the government had to choose between increasing taxes and spending more
on social benets and services, or decreasing taxes and spending less on social benets
and services, which should they do?. Answers are measured on a 0-10 scale, where 0
indicates that Government should decrease taxes a lot and spend much less on social
benets and services, whereas 10 corresponds to Government should increase taxes
a lot and spend much more on social benets and services. The question directly
associates social benets to the need of their nancing via taxes. As such, by taking
into account both the revenue and the expenditure sides of government activity, it can
usefully be employed to recover peoples preferences for the size of government. We plot
the densities of this variable across the di¤erent countries in Figure 2. The histograms
illustrate the presence of a non negligible number of observations at the two tails of the
distribution within each country. Moreover, some common patterns emerge for specic
group of countries. For instance, in the Nordic economies, characterized by already
generous welfare systems, the distribution has a fat tail on the right. In another group
of countries, which includes several Eastern European countries, the fat tail is to the
left. Finally, a third group comprising, among others, countries in continental Europe
such as France, Germany and Belgium, show more balanced distributions.
As the question focuses on taxes and expenditure linked to redistributive policies,
it allows us to test explicitly how preferences for redistribution a¤ect the demand for
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government intervention. As a preliminary step, Figure 3 depicts the distribution of
this latter variable categorized for the stated preferences for political redistribution.
Evidently, those who prefer an increase in taxes and social benets are concentrated
among the respondents favoring government intervention in reducing di¤erences in in-
come. While this might not come as surprise, further country-level evidence shows that
it might be indeed signicant di¤erences among the two variables when it comes to
explaining actual aggregate outcomes. Figure 4 shows a positive correlation between
a country GDP share of social protection spending and its demand for larger govern-
ment. On the contrary, larger preferences for redistribution are negatively associated
with the size of redistributive expenditures. The same picture emerges when consider-
ing the revenue side of the government budget (Figure 5). The share of tax revenues
as a percentage of GDP correlates positively with the demand for larger government,
whereas the correlation reverses when preference for redistribution are considered. The
individual level analysis in the next section sheds some light on the additional factors
that, by inuencing the demand for larger government, might ultimately translate into
the observed di¤erent sizes of national governments. Those factors relate to individual
values and attitudes towards income inequality, as well as to beliefs of fairness, altruis-
tic preferences and trust, as highlighted in the existing literature. In addition to these
factors, however, perceptions of the sustainability of the welfare system, of the e¢ cient
and fair functioning of the institutions through which redistribution and social assis-
tance takes place, as well as beliefs on the socio-economic consequences of redistribution
contribute to explain the demand for more extensive government intervention.
4 Individual level evidence
Preferences on the size of government is our left-hand side variables throughout this
section. Since the dependent variable is ordered and discrete, we adopt and ordered
logit specication for the estimating equation. We include on the right-hand side of the
equation a number of socio-demographic individual characteristics that are expected to
inuence peoples attitudes towards government size1. In particular, we control for the
1See, for instance, Shapiro and Mahajan (1986) on gender di¤erences in preferences for redistribu-
tion; Tan (2006), Neustadt (2010) and Scheve and Stasavage (2006) on the role of religion in shaping
those preferences.
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age and sex of the respondent, as well as civil status, religiosity (via a set of dummy for
the di¤erent religious denominations), years of education, political orientation. A set
of dummies captures labor market status, distinguishing among unemployed, out of the
labor force and retired individuals. Country xed e¤ects are also included among the
controls in order to absorb country-specic factors, thus reducing the scope for omitted
variable bias in the cross-section.
Since the seminal contribution of Meltzer and Richard (1981), self-interest has been
traditionally considered an important determinant of preferences for redistributive poli-
cies. Richer individuals should prefer smaller government as they are more likely to bear
the costs through progressive taxation, while not receiving income-supporting transfers.
Likewise, they are less likely to benet from publicly provided private goods and social
protection services. The level of current income should thus capture this e¤ect. The
ESS provides some information on total net household income, which includes income
from all sources including labor income and income from capital and investments. In
particular, each respondent is asked to report which income category, identied with
a letter, best approximates his or her households total net income. Identifying each
bracket with its mid-point allows us to associate each income bracket with a monetary
value2. Then, to proxy for the net pecuniary gain from governmental redistribution
(Roberts, 1977), we construct a measure of the distance separating the households
income to the average income in the individuals country of residence by taking the
log-di¤erence of the the two values.
The baseline estimates are reported in Table 2, columns 1 and 2. Age and, ex-
pectedly, left-wing ideological orientation are positively associated with preferences for
a larger government. The relationship is also highly statistically signicant and sub-
stantially una¤ected when country xed e¤ects are omitted. Women, more educated
individuals as well as retired workers prefer larger government, although the statistical
signicance of the e¤ects critically depend on the inclusion of xed e¤ects. The coe¢ -
cient of the income variable is never estimated with precision and in the specication
2In contrast to the previous rounds, the brackets in ESS round 4 are national categories based on
deciles of the actual household income distribution in the given country. However, using the decile-
based income variable eliminates from the sample a number of countries for which it wasnt possible to
construct such variable, and therefore still use the classication used in the previous ESS. To retain as
many countries as possible, we identify each bracket with its mid-point. Monetary values are converted
in Euros using the relevant exchange rates applicable at the time when the survey was elded, made
available in the documentation report.
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with xed e¤ects has a positive sign. Thus, self-interest does not explain the demand
for higher benets and taxes.
We contend that, insofar as government intervention is associated with redistribu-
tive policies, preferences for redistribution should directly a¤ect the demand for a large
government. Hence, the specications in columns 3 and 4 introduce also preferences for
redistribution as an independent variable. The control is dened as a dummy variable
that takes the value of 1 if the respondent agrees of strongly agrees that the govern-
ment should reduce income di¤erences. The point estimate of 0.345 is both sizable in
magnitude and statistically signicant (at 1% level). Removing country xed e¤ects
reduces somewhat the value of the coe¢ cient (to 0.26), which is still estimated with
high precision. According to these estimates, the odds of preferring a larger government
are about 30-40 percentage points higher for individuals favoring political redistribution
compared to those that disagree on government reducing income inequality.
4.1 Fairness and altruism
Several contributions in the literature emphasize the importance of fairness of market
outcomes and the perceived determinants of inequality, in particular whether inequality
emerges from di¤erent e¤orts and ability of individuals or, alternatively, is mostly the
result of luck, connections, perhaps unworthy activities etc. (Alesina and La Ferrara,
2005; Alesina and Angeletos, 2005). When they believe that income is determined
by e¤ort and talent, people might indeed see income di¤erences as a just reward for
these factors. In the other case they might be moved by considerations of fairness or
social justice, and prefer corrections to the observed unequal market outcomes. Two
questions allow us to capture these di¤erent aspects. The rst statement reads: Large
di¤erences in peoples incomes are acceptable to properly reward di¤erences in talents
and e¤orts. Preferences for social fairness are captured using the question:For a
society to be fair, di¤erences in peoples standard of living should be small. Again,
respondents are asked to express the degree to which they agree/disagree with the
statements on a 1-5 scale. We dene two dummy variables that take value of 1 in case
the respondent declares to agree or strongly agree with each of the two statements.
The results are reported in Table 3. Column 1 shows, not surprisingly, that those who
believe on self-determination (i.e. that hard work is rewarded by higher income) are
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less likely to support governmental redistribution. The point estimates suggest that
the odds of supporting a large government are reduced by 15 percentage points. Of
roughly the same magnitude, with a positive sign, is the estimated coe¢ cient for the
belief about unfairness of income di¤erences. The e¤ect is again strongly statistically
signicant.
Following Fong (2001), we also test altruistic motivations behind the demand for
larger government by using the following question: Its very important to her/him to
help the people around her/him. She/he wants to care for their well-being. Respon-
dents are asked to state to what extent the reported description corresponds to their
own personal characteristics. The range of answers goes from 1 for very much like
meto 6 for not at all like me. Hence, we dene a dummy variable taking value of 1
for category 1, and zero otherwise. The estimated coe¢ cient has the expected positive
sign and is signicant at 5% level. Importantly, it does not a¤ect the signicance and
the size of the coe¢ cient for preferences for redistribution compared to the baseline
estimates.
4.2 Trust
There is a large literature pointing to strong and signicant e¤ects of trust on economic
outcomes. Recently, Algan et al. (2011), using the ESS, investigate extensively the ef-
fects of trust on many aspects of the welfare state. However, as stressed by Fehr (2009),
answers to the general trust questions like those asked in the main cross-country sur-
veys likely reect not only individualsbeliefs about otherstrustworthiness, but also
individualspreferences towards risk, and in particular towards social risk3. Alterna-
tively, it has been argued (Cox, 2004) that trust may reect pure altruistic preferences
in addition to beliefs about otherstrustworthiness, so that for given beliefs more altru-
istic individuals would exhibit more trust. In the previous section, we have addressed
the latter concern by introducing explicitly a measure of altruism among the inde-
pendent variables. To control for the e¤ects of preferences for social risk that might
partially show up in the trust measures, we resort to a set of questions in the ESS
3The classical question asked to elicits trust beliefs reads as follows:Generally speaking, would you
say that most people can be trusted, or that you cant be too careful in delaing with people?. The
responses can be binary, or alternatively dened over a range of values (like in the ESS), which allows
one to capture also the intensity of trust.
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specically intended to elicit individualsbeliefs about otherstrustworthiness in the
use of welfare services. The rst of these statements asks to express agreement with
the following:Most unemployed people do not really try to nd a job. A second ques-
tion reads: Many people manage to obtain benets and services to which they are not
entitled, and nally, a third statement is: Employees often pretend they are sick in
order to stay at home. Responses to the three statements are classied on a range
from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates strong agreement and 5 strong disagreement. Thus lower
values signal beliefs that other people are not trustworthy. Accordingly, for each of the
statements, we built a dichotomous variable that takes value 1 if the respondent agrees
or agrees strongly, and 0 otherwise. The last column of Table 3 shows that, as expected,
those who do not trust others are less likely to support a large government compared
to those who believe in people trustworthiness. The largest e¤ect is to be attributed
to the belief that people might be voluntarily unemployed, which reduces the odds of
demanding larger governmental redistributive policies by 27 percentage points. The
general possibility of people cheating in order to obtain more social benets than what
they would be legally entitled to, as well to benet from special schemes such as paid
sick leave, exert also a negative and strongly signicant e¤ect, with the point estimates
around one third lower.
4.3 E¤ects of social benets
Do the perceived impacts of social benets contribute to shape the demand for redis-
tributive policies? In a rather simplistic assessment, one could think that the welfare
system will be supported to the extent that it is deemed as having corrective e¤ects on
existing economic and social distortions. Needless to say, however, the answer to this
question lies crucially in what is considered distortive, and hence relates fundamentally
to the issues of fairness and altruism investigated above. In fact, those who value so-
cial equality will support a large government if they perceive that social benets are
able to e¤ectively combat poverty and reduce income inequalities. However, the overall
impact is more subtle, as a generous welfare system might itself induce distortions to
individual incentives. For instance, reducing income inequalities might correspondingly
reduce the incentives to work hard or invest in human capital (Bell and Freeman, 1999).
As emphasized by Alesina and Giuliano (2009), if there are externalities in e¤ort and
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education acquisition, this may work to the detriment of society as a whole, since the
aggregate level of e¤ort/investment in education would go down as a consequence of
more generous redistributive policies, as shown by Benabou (2006; 2002). A trade-o¤
would therefore emerge between equality and economic e¢ ciency. A set of questions
of the ESS allows us to analyze how the perceived e¤ects of social benets on society
as well as on individual incentives a¤ect the support for a large government. The gen-
eral formulation reads: Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree that social
benets and services in [country]: ..., with the following statements associated: 1)
. . . prevent widespread poverty?; 2) . . . lead to a more equal society?; 3) . . .make
people lazy?; 4) . . .make people less willing to care for one another?; 5) . . .make
people less willing to look after themselves and their family?. The possible answers are
coded on a 1-5 range, with 1 indicating strong agreement and 5 strong disagreement.
As before we build for each of these questions dichotomous variables taking unit value if
the respondent agrees or strongly agrees with the statements, and zero otherwise. The
results of the estimation are reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 4. Consistent with
the ndings in section 4.1, the perceived reduction in widespread poverty and in income
inequality due to social benets is associated with a higher likelihood of supporting a
large government. The estimated coe¢ cients reveal a sizable impact for the e¤ects on
inequalities. Column 2 reports the estimates for the variables capturing the perceived
e¤ects on individual incentives. All of them enter the equation with a negative sign
and are highly signicant. The point estimates show that the respondents are mainly
concerned about the negative e¤ects of social benets on individual e¤ort, rather than
about those on altruistic attitudes towards other people or family members.
An important channel through which a generous welfare state might a¤ect society
as a whole is immigration. The idea that immigrants are attracted to the welfare
state because of its benets, in the form of social security, education, etc., is well
known. The economic literature on welfare-induced migration is large and growing, with
mixed results for what concerns both the US internal migration and more in general
international migration (Razin et al., 2011). The main concerns are motivated by the
potential distortions in the distribution as well as by the composition of migration ows,
potentially biased towards poorer people and low-skilled workers4. These elements
4Another channel through which massive migration might put strains on national budgets is through
the provision of public goods in general, as more heterogeneous societies, which could be the ultimate
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would add to the scal cost of the welfare state, and have side-e¤ects on the labor
market outcomes, particularly for the lower end of the wage distribution. Such concerns
have been emphasized after the latest rounds of enlargement of the European Union (De
Giorgi and Pellizzari, 2009). Therefore, investigating if the possibility of welfare-induced
immigration reduces support for more governmental redistribution in our sample of
post-enlargement European countries is worthwhile. To this purpose, we employ the
following ESS question: Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree that social
benets and services in [country] encourage people from other countries to come and
live here?. Possible answers range as usual from strong agreement (valued 1) to strong
disagreement (valued 5). We dene accordingly a dummy variable equal to 1 in case
the respondent agrees or strongly agrees with the statement, and zero otherwise. The
estimates are reported in the last column of Table 4. The coe¢ cient has a negative
sign and is statistically highly signicant (1% level). Hence, the threatof immigration
due to generous social transfers and services leads people to decrease their support for
redistributive policies, ceteris paribus. The e¤ect is also sizable in magnitude, as the
odds of being more supportive for a large government decrease by 17% for those who
believe that redistributive policies encourage immigration compared to the individuals
who do not have such view.
4.4 E¢ ciency and impartiality
Perceptions on the actual functioning of the institutions through which redistribution
and social assistance take place is likely to inuence the support for a large government.
Recent experimental evidence (Durante and Putterman, 2009) shows for instance that
support for redistribution is sensitive to the cost associated with imposing a tax. In
fact, if people perceive that resources are wasted due to ine¢ ciencies, their willingness
to contribute to the system might decrease. The same is likely to happen if they
believe that they are not treated equally, for instance because institutions are prone
to corruption. In this section we investigate how those additional factors a¤ect the
support for governmental redistribution.
A rst set of questions asks opinions on the e¢ ciency and fairness of the providers
of health care services as well as of the tax authorities. A rst question asks: How
result of large-scale immigration, seem to be associated with larger expenditure on such goods (Alesina
et al., 1997).
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e¢ cient do you think the tax authorities are at things like handling queries on time,
avoiding mistakes and preventing fraud?. The answer ranges from 0 if the respon-
dent considers that tax authorities are extremely ine¢ cient to 10 if tax authorities are
considered as extremely e¢ cient. A related question asks: Tell me whether you think
the tax authorities in your country give special advantages to certain people or deal
with everyone equally?. The answer ranges from 0 if the respondent considers that
tax authorities give special advantages to certain people to 10 if he believes that tax
authorities deal with everyone equally.
By the same token, similar questions are asked with reference to health services.
The rst relates to e¢ ciency: Still thinking about the provision of social benets and
services, please tell me how e¢ cient you think the provision of health care in [ country]
is. Again, the answer ranges from very e¢ cient to very ine¢ cient, with the same 0-10
values associated as before. The nal question reads: Please tell me whether you think
doctors and nurses in [ country] give special advantages to certain people or deal with
everyone equally?. Respondents can place their answer on a scale from 1 to 10, where
again higher values indicate equal treatment.
For each of these questions we create a dummy variable that takes the value of 1
if the respondent is inclined to think that the system is ine¢ cient or gives unequal
treatment i.e., if the answer to the corresponding question ranges from 0 to 3 and
zero otherwise. Therefore, we expect such variables to a¤ect negatively the demand for
a larger government, ceteris paribus. The results, reported in the rst two columns in
Table 5, show indeed that the odds of supporting a larger versus a smaller government
decrease by roughly 20-25% for those who perceive redistributive institutions to be
ine¢ cient or inequitable compared to respondents who believe they are e¢ cient and
equitable.
4.5 Sustainability
When one considers its nancing, the actual demand for more generous benets might
also be inuenced by beliefs of sustainability. Considerations on the cost of providing
widespread generous social benets, in its current and prospective e¤ects on the econ-
omy, might signicantly inuence the actual demand for them. To capture these e¤ects,
we resort to several questions of the ESS. A rst general statement concerns whether
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social benets/services place too great a strain on the economy. In addition, the opin-
ion of the respondent is asked on whether she/he believes that social benets/services
cost businesses too much in taxes and charges. Responses to the these statements are
classied on a scale ranging from 1 for strong agreement to 5 for strong disagreement.
Again, we construct two indicators equal to 1 when agreement or strong agreement is
expressed, and zero otherwise.
On a related note, the views of the respondents on the long term sustainability of
the welfare system are also recorded. In particular, respondents are asked to provide
their opinion on whether the level of public health care in [country] will be a¤ordable
10 years from now. The following answers are possible: 1) [country] will not be able
to a¤ord the present level of public health care; 2) [country] will be able to a¤ord the
present level of public health care but not to increase it; 3) [country] will be able to
a¤ord to increase the level of public health care. Here, we dene a dummy that equals
1 if the present level of services is deemed una¤ordable in the longer term, and zero in
case of alternative answer. The results are reported in the last two columns in Table 5.
As expected, the estimated coe¢ cients have a negative sign. They are all statistically
signicant at the 1% level. Interestingly, support for governmental redistribution seems
to be inuenced more strongly by issues related to the current nancing, rather than
the prospective sustainability. The coe¢ cients associated with the variables capturing
beliefs on perceived strains placed on the economy, and on businesses in particular,
are in fact double the size of the point estimates for the variables measuring long term
sustainability. These latter beliefs reduce the odds of demanding more government
redistribution by 20 percentage points.
5 Preferences for progressive tax schedules
The design of the tax system is a major element in redistributive policies of developed
economies. Designed to collect a greater proportion of income from the rich relative to
the poor, progressive tax schedules have the intended aim of reducing the inequality of
disposable income relative to taxable income. However, as progressivity increases, indi-
viduals may respond by reducing their taxable income. This can be achieved by either
decreasing labor supply or simply reporting a smaller share of true income through tax
evasion or avoidance. Hence, taxes are a primary determinant of economic behavior and
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may help to explain large observed di¤erences in labor supply, economic activity, and
growth across countries and over time. As actual tax systems arise through a political
process, they are likely to represent some aggregation of individual preferences. These
preferences may reect individual self-interest, as highlighted by conventional political-
economic theories, but also fairness aspects, e.g., fairness preferences, economic beliefs
and fairness assessment of the status quo income inequality, as suggested by recent
experimental evidence (Ackert et al., 2006; Durante and Putterman, 2009).
The empirical literature analyzing the determinants of preferences for alternative tax
schedules is rather limited, reecting probably the scarcity of ad hoc survey data. Using
a survey on several OECD countries, Singhal (2009) investigates to which extent self-
reported preferences reect the actual tax schedules. Among the possible determinants,
however, her data allows only the investigation of the self-interest motivation behind
stated preferences. A broader analysis, which includes beliefs, fairness assessment and
information, is carried out by Heinemann and Hennighausen (2010) in their study of
attitudes towards progressive taxation in Germany.
A specic question in the ESS round four uncovers individual attitudes towards
progressive taxation. Respondents are asked the following question: Think of two
people, one earning twice as much as the other. Which of the three statements on this
card comes closest to how you think they should be taxed?. The participant can choose
among the following answers:
1) They should both pay the same share (same %) of their earnings in tax so that
the person earning twice as much pays double in tax
2) The higher earner should pay a higher share (a higher %) of their earnings in tax
so the person earning twice as much pays more than double in tax
3) They should both pay the same actual amount of money in tax regardless of their
di¤erent levels of earnings
Hence, alternative 1) describes a system of proportional income taxation, whereas
alternatives 2) and 3) indicate progressive and regressive taxation, respectively.
As a preliminary cross-country analysis, Figure 5 depicts the scatterplots for the
fraction of respondents who state their preference for a progressive tax schedule and
the progressivity indexes, calculated for the personal income tax alone as well as taking
the full tax wedge into account. The graphs show a positive correlation between the
observed aggregate outcomes and individual preferences. Turning to the individual
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data, Figure 6 depicts the response patterns across countries. While regressive taxation
has a very limited appeal, in several countries progressive taxation is preferred by the
vast majority of respondents. At face value, the large share of individuals calling for
progressive income taxation across countries seems to corroborate the importance of
motives other than self-interest calculus in determining preferences.
Thus, we investigate the determinants of such preferences in a multivariate frame-
work. We adopt a multinomial logit specication for the estimating equation of the
demand for the alternative types of tax systems. In the individual-level analysis we use
preferences for proportional taxation as the base category, which allows us to directly
test the determinants of the choice for a strictly progressive vs. a proportional income
taxation. These are the most relevant alternatives from a policy perspective5.
A number of the variables that a¤ect the choice for larger government can be thought
of as inuencing also the design of the tax system. Hence, the right hand side of the
equation controls extensively for socio-demographic variables, such as age, sex, years
of education, religiosity, political orientation, labor market status. In line with the
traditional political economy literature, we control for the self-interest motivation by
including the variable dened as the log-di¤erence of household income with respect to
the average income in the country. The results are shown in Table 6, columns 1 and
2 without and with xed e¤ects, respectively. Conrming the hypothesis of a status
quo bias (She¤rin, 1994), the coe¢ cient for age is positive and signicant. Left-wing
political orientation increases the propensity to prefer progressive over proportional
taxation. Likewise, being unemployed is positively associated with the preference for
progressive tax schedules.
Richer individuals are less likely to prefer progressive tax schedules. The coe¢ cient
is at the limit of the 1% signicance level. This nding is fully consistent with the
Meltzer and Richard (1981) hypothesis, but strikingly di¤erent from the results in the
previous sections where the same variable was found exerting no statistically signicant
e¤ect on the demand for a larger government. According to the point estimates, an
increase in income by one standard deviation decreases the odds of choosing progressive
versus proportional taxation by roughly 8 percentage points. The results are virtually
unchanged irrespective of the presence of country xed e¤ects among the controls.
As discussed above, an important non-pecuniary motivation behind the demand for
5Regression results for the third category of regressive taxation are therefore not reported.
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progressive taxation lies in individual attitudes towards redistributive policies. Hence,
we add to the controls the dummy capturing the preferences for political redistribution
(dened in section 4). The results are shown in column 3 of Table 6. The coe¢ cient is
positive and strongly signicant, and its size substantial. According to this estimate,
the odds of preferring progressive over proportional taxation are 50% higher for those
who support political redistribution.
Finally, we control for beliefs of fairness/unfairness concerning inequalities in the
distribution of income, as dened in section 4.1. As reported in column 4 of Table 6,
beliefs that income di¤erences are a just reward for individual e¤ort lower the odds of
preferring progressive taxation. On the other hand, considering di¤erences in individ-
ualsstandard of living unfair leads to a stronger support for progressive taxation over
proportional tax schedules. The estimated coe¢ cient on preferences for redistribution,
although marginally lower in size, retains its high statistical signicance.
6 Conclusion
Using recent data from the European Social Survey covering 30 European countries, we
analyze the determinants of individual attitudes regarding governmental redistributive
polices along two dimension: the size of government, dened in terms of more generous
benets nanced by higher taxes, and progressive taxation. In the rst instance, our
dependent variable, capturing the implications of redistribution for the public budget,
can immediately measure individual support for a large government. We nd not only
that preferences for redistribution are a signicant determinant of such support, but
also that other factors linked to the beliefs on the social and economic e¤ects of re-
distributive policies, the perceived functioning of the welfare state institutions, as well
as trust, explain di¤erent individual attitudes toward redistributive public policies. In
addition, as the design of the tax system is a major element in redistributive policies of
developed economies, we also test the determinants of stated preference for progressive
tax schedules. Again, we nd that preferences for redistribution, as well as associated
attitudes towards inequality and fairness, matter a lot in explaining such preferences.
While not inuencing the support for a large governrnent, self-interest makes people
more averse to progressive taxation. Overall, these ndings might give useful indications
to assess the political feasibility of tax reforms, as well as of alternative measures to
17
achieve scal consolidation. This is particularly relevant for the policy agenda given the
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Tables and graphs
Table 1: Individual-level data, sample and country averages







Belgium BE 1760 2.233 5.058 1.663
Bulgaria BG 2230 1.907 4.846 1.632
Croatia HR 1484 2.026 4.818 1.577
Cyprus CY 1215 2.000 5.721 1.639
Czech Republic CZ 2018 2.491 5.183 1.673
Denmark DK 1610 2.896 5.978 1.706
Estonia EE 1661 2.224 5.613 1.689
Finland FI 2195 2.045 5.890 1.684
France FR 2073 1.956 5.044 1.524
Germany DE 2751 2.288 4.811 1.602
Greece GR 2072 1.6022 5.164 1.551
Hungary HU 1544 1.710 3.588 1.667
Ireland IE 1764 2.210 5.199 1.835
Israel IL 2490 2.032 5.510 1.845
Latvia LV 1980 1.861 4.633 1.568
Lithuania LT 2002 2.136 4.513 1.707
Netherlands NL 1778 2.583 5.284 1.686
Norway NO 1549 2.465 5.601 1.587
Poland PL 1619 2.161 4.466 1.671
Portugal PT 2367 1.795 4.912 1.515
Romania RO 2146 1.882 3.629 1.591
Russia RU 2512 2.098 5.215 1.618
Slovakia SK 1810 2.182 5.201 1.608
Slovenia SI 1286 1.844 4.548 1.679
Spain ES 2576 2.011 5.276 1.652
Sweden SE 1830 2.301 5.440 1.613
Switzerland CH 1819 2.317 5.111 1.628
Turkey TR 2461 1.727 5.312 1.540
Ukraine UA 1 845 1.884 5.241 1.613
United Kingdom GB 2352 2.474 5.231 1.707
Notes: The table lists all the countries for which individual-level data were available in the EES round 4.
It reports the sample sizes and the country average for the three main variables of interest.
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Table 2: Demand for a large government: baseline estimates
age 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.007
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
female 0.057 0.043 0.043 0.031
(0.032)* (0.032) (0.031)* (0.032)
married -0.064 -0.083 -0.068 -0.088
(0.032)* (0.042)** (0.031)** (0.042)**
left 0.474 0.454 0.434 0.423
(0.095)*** (0.091)*** (0.087)*** (0.085)***
catholic 0.012 -0.254 0.013 -0.269
(0.029) (0.081)*** (0.026) (0.084)***
orthodox -0.080 -0.273 -0.074 -0.286
(0.069) (0.278) (0.072) (0.283)
protestant -0.045 0.150 -0.036 0.166
(0.032) (0.093) (0.030) (0.097)*
jew -0.426 0.268 -0.378 0.263
(0.103)*** (0.071)*** (0.113)*** (0.074)***
years of education 0.008 0.007 0.012 0.010
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006)* (0.007)
unemployed 0.114 0.013 0.104 -0.001
(0.064)* (0.070) (0.064) (0.071)
out of labor force 0.069 -0.002 0.068 -0.011
(0.085) (0.090) (0.084) (0.091)
retired 0.125 0.029 0.122 0.022
(0.045)*** (0.046) (0.044)*** (0.045)
income 0.037 -0.001 0.045 0.005
(0.034) (0.021) (0.031) (0.020)
preferences for 0.0345 0.0261
redistribution (0.061)*** (0.065)***
Fixed e¤ects Y N Y N
Observations 37547 37547 37301 37301
Pseudo R-sq. 0.020 0.006 0.022 0.007
Notes: This table presents estimates of the determinants of preferences on the size of
government at the individual level. The estimation method is the Maximum Likeli-
hood ordered logit model. Robust standard errors clustered by country are presented
in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote signicance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respec-
tively.
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Table 3: Demand for a large government: fairness and trust
age 0.006 0.006 0.007
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
female 0.036 0.039 0.043
(0.031) (0.030) (0.031)
married -0.069 -0.071 -0.073
(0.031)** (0.031)** (0.030)**
left 0.414 0.430 0.409
(0.081)*** (0.085)*** (0.083)***
catholic 0.016 0.013 0.021
(0.026) (0.025) (0.028)
orthodox -0.060 -0.073 -0.059
(0.071) (0.074) (0.072)
protestant -0.030 -0.040 -0.045
(0.031) (0.030) (0.028)
jew -0.299 -0.380 -0.378
(0.109)*** (0.106)*** (0.117)***
years of education 0.013 0.011 0.005
(0.006)** (0.006)* (0.005)
unemployed 0.094 0.104 0.054
(0.066)** (0.063) (0.064)
out of labor force 0.073 0.063 0.031
(0.088) (0.086) (0.082)
retired 0.122 0.125 0.142
(0.043)*** (0.043)*** (0.042)***
income 0.048 0.047 0.034
(0.030) (0.031) (0.029)
preferences for redistribution 0.273 0.342 0.378
(0.050)*** (0.061)*** (0.062)***
income di¤erences reward -0.159
e¤ort (0.050)***
income di¤erences unfair 0.161
(0.036)***
important to help others 0.071
(0.034)**
unemployed do not seek job -0.318
(0.050)***
people cheat to get more social benets -0.200
(0.034)***
employees cheat on sick leave -0.192
(0.036)***
Fixed e¤ects Y Y Y
Observations 36880 36430 35249
Pseudo R-sq. 0.023 0.022 0.027
Notes: This table presents estimates of the determinants of preferences on the size of government
at the individual level. The estimation method is the Maximum Likelihood ordered logit model.
Robust standard errors clustered by country are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote
signicance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 4: Demand for a large government: e¤ects of social benets
age 0.006 0.007 0.006
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
female 0.052 0.041 0.043
(0.032) (0.031) (0.032)
married -0.071 -0.071 -0.077
(0.032)** (0.031)** (0.031)**
left 0.432 0.394 0.435
(0.086)*** (0.078)*** (0.085)***
catholic 0.011 0.030 0.011
(0.027) (0.028) (0.028)
orthodox -0.070 -0.091 -0.078
(0.071) (0.080) (0.079)
protestant -0.055 -0.026 -0.033
(0.031)* (0.026) (0.030)
jew -0.286 -0.448 -0.408
(0.102)*** (0.116)*** (0.121)***
years of education 0.009 0.006 0.011
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)*
unemployed 0.101 0.095 0.092
(0.064) (0.063) (0.062)
out of labor force 0.056 0.047 0.052
(0.090) (0.085) (0.079)
retired 0.122 0.143 0.110
(0.044)*** (0.043)*** (0.043)**
income 0.045 0.047 0.047
(0.030) (0.032) (0.032)





lead to equal society 0.236
(0.039)***
make people lazy -0.475
(0.047)***
make people less willing -0.129
to care for one another (0.032)***
make people less willing -0.243
to look after selves and family (0.031)***
encourage immigration -0.192
(0.046)***
Fixed e¤ects Y Y Y
Observations 36413 36398 36076
Pseudo R-sq. 0.024 0.030 0.023
Notes: This table presents estimates of the determinants of preferences on the size of government
at the individual level. The estimation method is the Maximum Likelihood ordered logit model.
Robust standard errors clustered by country are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote
signicance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 5: Demand for a large government: functioning and sustainability
age 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.007
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
female 0.049 0.044 0.030 0.051
(0.031) (0.033) (0.031) (0.032)
married -0.064 -0.062 -0.052 -0.060
(0.031)** (0.032)* (0.032) (0.032)*
left 0.451 0.478 0.383 0.441
(0.086)*** (0.086)*** (0.076)*** (0.087)***
catholic 0.008 -0.001 0.035 0.017
(0.027) (0.026) (0.028) (0.028)
orthodox -0.072 -0.090 -0.074 -0.079
(0.077) (0.090) (0.072) (0.072)
protestant -0.046 -0.048 -0.043 -0.033
(0.029) (0.028)* (0.078) (0.028)
jew -0.323 0.426 -0.379 -0.371
(0.097)*** (0.114)*** (0.122)*** (0.114)***
years of education 0.013 0.012 0.008 0.012
(0.006)** (0.006)** (0.005) (0.006)**
unemployed 0.129 0.097 0.091 0.110
(0.063)** (0.065) (0.062) (0.064)*
out of labor force 0.088 0.052 0.062 0.057
(0.079) (0.082) (0.085) (0.079)
retired 0.107 0.122 0.109 0.106
(0.043)** (0.041)** (0.041)*** (0.046)**
income 0.045 0.050 0.046 0.040
(0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031)
preferences for redistribution 0.356 0.372 0.336 0.357
(0.061)*** (0.060)*** (0.059)*** (0.061)***
health care providers -0.231
ine¢ cient (0.042)***
health care providers -0.256
inequitable (0.036)***
tax authorites ine¢ cient -0.251
(0.060)***
tax authorites inequitable -0.307
(0.044)***
social benets too costly -0.438
for business (0.040)***
social benets strain -0.457
the economy (0.051)***
social benets unsustainable -0.225
in 10 years (0.037)***
Fixed e¤ects Y Y Y Y
Observations 36598 34297 35326 35492
Pseudo R-sq. 0.024 0.025 0.031 0.024
Notes: This table presents estimates of the determinants of preferences on the size of government at
the individual level. The estimation method is the Maximum Likelihood ordered logit model. Robust
standard errors clustered by country are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote signicance at
the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 6: Preferences for progressive taxation
age 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
female - 0.050 -0.043 -0.062 0.079
(0.031) (0.033) (0.035)* (0.037)**
married 0.030 0.045 0.042 0.042
(0.039) (0.027)* (0.027) (0.027)
left 0.290 0.310 0.259 0.230
(0.048)*** (0.050)*** (0.043)*** (0.040)***
catholic 0.087 0.019 0.020 0.027
(0.112) (0.043) (0.044) (0.043)
orthodox -0.001 0.135 0.129 0.142
(0.073) (0.056)** (0.054)* (0.057)**
protestant 0.079 0.009 0.019 0.023
(0.073) (0.047) (0.047) (0.045)
jew 1.126 0.087 0.125 0.201
(0.058)*** (0.092) (0.092) (0.090)**
years of education -0.005 -0.016 -0.012 -0.011
(0.008) (0.006)*** (0.006)** (0.006)**
unemployed 0.169 0.176 0.161 0.158
(0.072)** (0.061)*** (0.068)*** (0.069)***
out of labor force 0.013 0.016 -0.007 -0.000
(0.102) (0.099) (0.099) (0.102)
retired -0.044 -0.012 -0.014 -0.021
(0.053) (0.046) (0.046) (0.045)
income -0.071 - 0.074 -0.062 -0.056
(0.028)** (0.018)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)***
preferences for redistribution 0.445 0.357
(0.055)*** (0.043)***
income di¤erences reward -0.226
e¤ort (0.036)***
income di¤erences unfair 0.170
(0.038)***
Fixed e¤ects N Y Y Y
Observations 38090 38090 37834 37336
Pseudo R-sq. 0.015 0.031 0.037 0.040
Notes: This table presents estimates of the determinants of preferences for progressive tax schedules at
the individual level. Preferences for proportional taxation are the baseline category. The estimation
method is the Maximum Likelihood multinomial logit model. Robust standard errors clustered by
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Figure 2. Opinions on the size of government: density functions by country 
 
Government should decrease taxes a lot and spend much less on social benefits and services (0) - Government should increase taxes 












Agree strongly Agree Neither agree nor 
disagree
Disagree Disagree strongly
decrease benefits/taxes increase benefits/taxes
 
The histogram shows the distribution of answers to the ESS question on decreasing vs. increasing social benefits and taxes, 
categorized by the responses given to the question on preferences for redistribution. The answers on the X-axis refer to the question: 
“The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels”.  
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Figure 4. Social expenditure, preferences for redistribution and demand for a 
large government 
 
The scatterplots illustrate the cross-country correlations between the percentage of GDP 
allocated to social protection spending and the fraction of respondents to the ESS who want 
an increase in taxes/benefits (upper panel) and of those who prefer political redistribution 
(lower panel).  
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Figure 5. Tax revenue, preferences for redistribution and demand for a large 
government 
 
The scatterplots illustrate the cross-country correlations between tax revenue in percentage of 
GDP and the fraction of respondents to the ESS who want an increase in taxes/benefits (upper 
panel) and of those who prefer political redistribution (lower panel).  
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Figure 6. Preferences for progressive tax schedules and observed progressivity  
 
The scatterplots illustrate the cross-country correlations between the fraction of respondents to the ESS who want a progressive tax 




Figure 6. Individual preferences over alternative tax schedules 

































The graph shows the fraction of respondents to the ESS question on the preferred type of personal income tax.  
 
 
